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Abstract— Security and distributed infrastructure are two of
the most common requirements for big data software. But the
security features of the big data platforms are still premature. It
is critical to identify, modify, test and execute some of the existing
security mechanisms before using them in the big data world. In
this paper, we propose a novel intrusion detection technique that
understands and works according to the needs of big data systems.
Our proposed technique identifies program level anomalies using
two methods - a profiling method that models application behavior
by creating process signatures from control-flow graphs; and a
matching method that checks for coherence among the replica
nodes of a big data system by matching the process signatures.
The profiling method creates a process signature by reducing the
control-flow graph of a process to a set of minimum spanning trees
and then creates a hash of that set. The matching method first
checks for similarity in process behavior by matching the received
process signature with the local signature and then shares the result
with all replica datanodes for consensus. Experimental results show
only 0.8% overhead due to the proposed technique when tested on
the hadoop map-reduce examples in real-time.
Index Terms—big data; intrusion detection; control-flow
graph;
I. INTRODUCTION
The architectures for big data systems rely on parallel
execution techniques like mapreduce [1] for fast processing.
With the growing popularity of real-time data processing in big
data environments, there is a pressing need to re-imagine the
traditional computing techniques. For example, data locality in
popular big data system distributions like hadoop [2] and spark
[3] is redefined as bringing compute to data instead of the
traditional approach of the moving the data that needs to get
processed. This trend of re-inventing the traditional methods
do not necessarily transform to the security needs of big
data. The security features implemented in big data systems
are still based on traditional methods for systems based on
general purpose machines. User authentication, multi-level
data access control and logging are typically used for security
in big data [4]. Data encryption is slowly being adopted in
the big data field, but it is limited by big data properties
like volume and velocity. As we covered in our previous
work [5], big data security is premature and there is a lot
of scope for improvement in this area. For instance, the
current security standards for big data systems assume system-
level consistency which is not necessarily true always. We
demonstrated in our previous work [5] that big data platforms
can be affected by insider attacks. In this work, we concentrate
on detecting process-level intrusions within big data systems.
Intrusion detection systems (IDS) can identify malicious use
based on their knowledge of possible threats or by learning
from the behavior of programs. Knowledge-based IDS usually
search a program for known threat signatures that are stored in
a database. With new and zero-day attacks emerging regularly,
it is impractical to have a pre-populated database of all
possible threats. Even if it is assumed to have such a database,
maintaining it would require a lot of resources and running
search queries against it would be expensive. Behavior based
IDS tries to model, analyze and compare application behavior
to identify anomalies. This technique needs more resources
and is more complex than signature-based IDS but it is
more effective in a dynamically changing threat environment.
Behavior based IDS generally use statistics and rules to detect
anomalies. Figure 1 gives a taxonomy of the different types
of IDS.
In today’s internet age, a distributed implementation of
IDS is needed for which aggregation, communication and
cooperation are key factors of success. Distributed IDS gives
centralized control and detects behavioral patterns even in
large networks but it has to be employed at multiple levels:
host, network and data [6]. Hence, using big data in general-
purpose distributed IDS implementations is recommended for
faster processing. In this work, we concentrate on IDS that
can be used for security within big data systems. IDS within
a big data system favors anamoly-based IDS when compared
to knowledge-based IDS because of the naturally large and
ever increasing scope of threats.
Using control-flow graphs for logic level intrusion detection
is a commonly known idea [7], [8], [9]. For example, control-
flow integrity [10] is a security mechanism that can identify
misuse of application logic bugs, like buffer-overflow attacks.
Though CFGs are generally sparse graphs, they can grow very
big in size. Hence, it is important to design IDS techniques that
can work with a reduced representation of CFGs. A Minimum
Spanning Tree (MST) contains all vertices and only some
paths of its source graph and the number of MSTs for sparse
graphs is generally less. Hence, a set of MSTs extracted from a
CFG can be used for IDS that detects program level anomalies.
In this paper, we propose a control-flow based intrusion de-
tection technique for big data systems. The proposed technique
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Fig. 1: A taxonomy of Intrusion Detection Techniques
checks for program level anomalies in big data applications
by analyzing and comparing the control-flow behavior of all
processes running inside a big data system. The proposed
intrusion detection technique is divided into two parts. First,
the control-flow of each process running on a data node in
the big data cluster is locally analyzed. This is done by
extracting a set of MSTs from the instruction level CFG of
a compiled program. The extracted set of MSTs are hashed
and stored in an array called the program signature. Then,
the stored program signature is encrypted and shared with
other replica nodes that run the same program. In the second
step, the received encrypted program signature is decrypted
and matched with the local version to check for coherence.
Matching two program signatures involves finding a perfect
match for every MST in a signature within the set of MSTs
of the other. The result of the matching step is then shared with
replica nodes for consensus. Our technique is designed to be
simple, scalable and efficient in identifying both control-flow
and brute-force attacks.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II gives some background about big data systems, control-
flow graphs and IDS. The various related works are also
discussed here. Section III explains the proposed intrusion
detection technique in detail. Experimental setup and results
are thoroughly discussed in Section IV. Finally, Section V
gives the conclusion and future work.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In this section, background about the three topics - big
data systems, control-flow graphs and intrusion detection is
provided. The related works are briefly outlined here.
A. Big Data Systems
Big data systems are data driven and their work can be
classified into 2 major tasks - writing user data to the disk
for storage and; reading stored data when user requests for it.
Typically, this data is quantified in units called blocks. For fast
and fault-tolerant service, big data systems rely on replication
of data blocks which in turn demands data consistency. Big
data systems cannot afford to have read or write service-level
inconsistency. The motivation for this work comes from a
weak assumption in the big data community that the services
used by a big data system to maintain data consistency are
never attacked. It is our knowledge that this problem has not
been widely addressed before.
To propose an IDS for big data services, it is important
to understand how the services work. For this, we picked 2
popular big data services - reads and writes. When a client (or
user) wants to write a block, the namenode picks n data nodes
from the big data cluster to complete this task where n is the
replication factor of the cluster. First the namenode checks if
the datanodes are ready. It sends a ready request to datanode1
which when ready, forwards that request to datanode2 and
so on. When the namenode knows that all n datanodes are
ready, it asks the client to start writing. The client only writes
to datanode1 which is subsequently written on to datanode2,
datanode3 and so on. In case of any failure, namenode orders
a new datanode to maintain block replicas. When the client
wants to read a block, namenode gives the client a list of
all datanodes that have the block and the client picks first
datanode. If there is a problem reading from datanode1, the
client request gets forwarded to the next datanode that has a
copy of the same block.
B. Control-flow Graphs
A control-flow graph (CFG) is a directed graph representa-
tion of a program and usually a sparse graph. CFGs include
all possible control paths in a program. This makes CFG
a great tool to obtain control-flow behavior of its process.
Vertices in a CFG give the level of detail, such as instruction-
level or basic block level, that cannot be further divided.
Edges in CFG represent control jumps and are classified
into two types - forward and backward. Branch instructions,
function calls, conditional and unconditional jumps account
for forward edges. Virtual calls and indirect function calls are
also considered as forward edges but their destinations are
difficult to determine. Loops and returns generally account
for backward edges. The integrity among duplicate processes
that run on replica nodes of a big data system can be verified
with the information available in a CFG [11]. Similarity check
between program logic of two programs can be performed by
comparing their CFGs for isomorphism. There are many ways
to check for such graph isomorphism [24], [25] but analyzing
the similarity of two processes by conducting CFG level graph
isomorphism is hard and time consuming. Graph isomorphism
is a complex problem, sometimes known to be NP-complete as
well [8]. To reduce the complexity of graph algorithms, CFGs
can be reduced to trees or subgraphs before performing any
coherence or integrity checks [12]. A CFG can be converted to
a tree using methods such as Depth-first traversal. Several tree
structures like Dominator Tree, Minimumm Spanning Tree
(MST), Minimumm Spanning Arborescence (MSA) can be
extracted form CFGs [13], [14], [15]. For this work, MST
and MSA can be used interchangeably. CFGs can be broken
into subgraphs using methods like k sub-graph matching and
(a) Source code to basic blocks
(b) Basic-block CFG
(c) MSA of CFG (d) Another MSA of CFG
Fig. 2: Multiple MSAs of same CFG
graph coloring. Some popular methods for graph reduction and
graph comparison that can be found in the literature are given
below (assume graphs to have n vertices and m edges):
• Based on Edit Distance: Using Smith-Waterman algo-
rithm with Levenshtein distance to identify similarity
between two graphs represented as strings [16]. The time
complexity is O(nm).
• Based on Traversal: (a) A preorder traversal of a graph G
where each node is processed before its descendants. (b)
A reverse postorder in a DAG gives a topological order
of the nodes [17].
• Based on Dominator trees: A data structure built using
Depth First Search or using the method proposed by
Tarjan in [18]. Tarjan’s method has a time complexity
of O((n+m)log(n+m)).
• Based on Reachability: Transitive reduction of a sparse
graph to another graph with fewer edges but same tran-
sitive closure [19]. The time complexity is O(nm).
In this work, we chose to reduce a CFG to a set of MSTs
because CFGs are generally sparse graphs and hence the
size of the set of MSTs will be finite and small. Edmond’s
algorithm can be used to extract MSTs from a digraph [13],
[14], [15]. Since an MST contains all vertices of its graph,
there will be no loss in the program instruction data. Depend-
ing on the connectedness of the graph, the edge count will
defer between the CFG and MST representation of a program.
Figure 2 shows transformation of a line of java code to basic
blocks of bytecode to CFG to set of MSAs. Vertices B1,
B2, B3, B4 are the basic blocks formed from java bytecode.
There exists an O(m + n log n) time algorithm to compute a
min-cost arborescence [13]. Alternately, another approach for
converting a CFG to MST using union find is used by popular
compilers like llvm and gcc for security purposes [?]. One
known disadvantage of using CFGs and MSTs for security is
that dynamic link library calls cannot be verified.
C. Intrusion Detection Systems
Traditionally, IDS checks for known malware in programs
by performing signature matching on a threat database [20].
Signature match using exact string matching is limited in
its scope. This is because variants of same attack will have
different signatures. Recently, methods to detect new malwares
using statistical machine learning have been proposed. Static
analysis using CFG is another efficient way to detect intrusions
but it is very complex [21]. Converting a CFG to a string
and implementing string matching is another way to deal with
this problem but the solution will not be polynomial. Also,
CFG at basic block level can have basic block variants that
look different but perform the same function. To deal with
these shortcomings, many approximate matching techniques
have been proposed. Tracing applications to get their CFG
is another approach that is used in applications like xtrace,
pivottrace etc [22], [23]. In case of big data systems, data
nodes usually have the same processor architecture. Hence
it can be assumed that there will be no variants when the
CFG is constructed at byte-level. It is then sufficient to
verify similarity among the CFGs of two processes to confirm
coherence in the nodes of a big data system.
III. PROPOSED TECHNIQUE
In this section, we describe our proposed two-step intrusion
detection technique for big data systems. The first step involves
capturing the control-flow of a process running on a datanode
of the big data system. The second step involves process-
level similarity check followed by consensus among replica
datanodes.
A. Generating Process Signatures
In this work, we emphasize on process level intrusion
detection by observing coherence in the behavior of duplicate
processes running on replica datanodes of a distributed big
data system. To capture the program behavior, the first step
is to identify a representation of the program that has the
information we need and filters out all other data. We call this
representation as the program signature. Since our goal is to
identify intrusions from control-flow mismatch, our program
signatures should contain all possible control flow information
of a program.
Compiled source code of a program is generally used to
generate static CFG. Since most big data frameworks use
(a) Steps in Generating Process Signatures
(b) Steps in Matching Process Signatures
Fig. 3: Proposed Algorithm for Intrusion Detection
a virtual machine (like JVM), an instruction level CFG in
this context is generated from java byte code. In this work,
disassembled object code (DOC) from java byte code is used
as input to generate the CFG at instruction level. It is important
for the program signature to contain only the information that
is necessary. Hence, every CFG is converted into a set of MSTs
that are later used to generate the program signature. In this
work, we propose the idea of representing a program by a
set of MSTs/MSAs that can be extracted from a byte-level
CFG using Edmonds algorithm. This set of MSTs that are
extracted from a CFG are further filtered to only the set of
edge-disjoint MSTs. There are many versions proposed for
Edmonds algorithm [13], [14], [15] and for this work we used
a version from NetworkX graph library [31] that generates
edge disjoint spanning trees from the root vertex of a given
digraph. Once a minimal representation of the logic in a
program is obtained in the form of an MSA, it is converted
into a string by listing the node list first followed by edge list,
which is in accordance to the DOT format representation.
The length of a MST string in DOT format is dependent
on program size. To make the comparison step faster, we
convert the variable length MST strings of a program to fixed
length strings using hashing. The extracted set of edge-disjoint
MSTs are hashed using popular hashing algorithms like SHA
or MD5 to generate a set of fixed-length hash strings. Since a
sparse graph like CFG can have multiple MSAs, the program
signature can be a single hash string or a set of hash strings.
Having all possible MSAs in the program signature makes the
graph similarity check more reliable. In the end, a program
signature is a set of fixed-length strings.
Program signatures are encrypted before being shared with
replica datanodes for tighter security. The private key for
encryption is generated from a harcoded master key if we use
secure hardware like the one proposed in our previous work
[5]. Every datanode in a big data system runs the proposed
profiling method for every running process and it includes
all the steps involved in converting the compiled binary of
a program to its program signature. A pictorial representation
of the steps in profiling method is given in Figure 3.
B. Matching Process Signatures
Replication property of big data systems opens scope for
new methods of implementing application logic level IDS
techniques. Process similarity check among duplicate nodes
of the cluster helps in checking for coherence among the
replica datanodes while performing a write or read operation.
When a process is scheduled to run on a datanode that hosts
the primary copy of a data, a signature for that process is
created by the profiling method (Step 1) of our proposed IDS
technique and that signature string is shared with all replica
datanodes. In the matching method (Step 2), these signatures
received from other datanodes are decrypted and matched
with the local versions of the same process. The results are
shared with all other replica datanodes for consensus. For
secure communication among datanodes, we intend to use the
same secure communication protocol that was proposed in our
previous work [5].
The most important part of the matching method is to
check for similarity (or dissimilarity) between two program
signatures. Generally, graph similarity check can be performed
by checking node similarity and edge similarity. The following
points are considered while comparing MSTs to check for
similarity among programs:
• MSTs are sparse graphs obtained from byte-level CFGs.
Hence, checking for path sensitivity is not exponential.
• All edges are assumed to have the same weight of 1.
• The total number of MSTs for a CFG is limited (by
Cayley’s formula [26]).
• By Edmonds theorem, a graph which is k-connected
always has k edge-disjoint arborescences.
• Two MSTs are a perfect match if their node sets and edge
sets match exactly.
• If edge set of one MST is a subset of the edge set of
another MST, the source graphs of these MSTs are not
similar.
• Two graphs are similar if for every MST in one graph
there exists a perfect match in the set of MSTs of the
other graph.
• Hashing algorithms like SHA1 or MD5 are quick and
efficient.
Based on the points listed above, the following method
is developed for graph similarity check. Let us consider 2
control-flow graphs G1 and G2. Let <N1, E1> represent G1
where N1 is the node set of the graph G1 and E1 is the edge
set of the graph. Similarly, <N2, E2> represents G2 where
N2 is the node set of the graph G1 and E2 is the edge set of
the graph. After employing a variation of Edmonds algorithm
on these CFGs (such as finding all edge-disjoint MSTs), lets
us assume that M1 [<N1, E1′>] is the set of MST/MSA for
G1 and M2 [<N2, E2′>] is the set of MST/MSA for G2. In
order to check for similarity in both graphs G1 and G2, we
check if there is a perfect match in M2 for all MSTs in M1.
In order to simplify the match function, we propose using a
hash function on M1 and M2 that creates a unique hash for
every MST. Let H1 be a set of hashes generated from M1 and
H2 be the set of hashes from M2. If any hash in H1 does not
exist in H2, we deduce that the graphs are not equal.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, the experimental setup and experiments used
for testing the proposed technique are provided. The results
and some analysis are also provided.
A. Setup
An Amazon EC2 [27] m4.xlarge instance running Ubuntu
14.04 is used to generate MSTs (and their hashes) from CFGs
using SageMath. The proposed technique was implemented
and tested on an Amazon EC2 big data cluster of 5 t2.micro
nodes - 1 master node, 1 secondary master node and 3
datanodes with a replication factor of 3. The list of softwares
used in conducting our experiments are:
• SageMath [28] is a free open-source mathematics soft-
ware system for mathematical calculations.
• GraphML [29] is a popular graph representation format
which can used to represent both CFG and MST.
• Graphviz [30] is open source graph visualization soft-
ware that takes input in DOT format and makes diagrams
in useful formats.
• NetworkX [31] is a Python language software package
that provides graph algorithms like Edmonds and VF2.
• Control-flow graph factory [32] is a software that gen-
erates CFGs from java bytecode (class file) and exports
them to GraphML or DOT formats.
B. Experiments
The proposed intrusion detection technique was tested using
16 hadoop map-reduce examples that can be found in all
hadoop distributions. These examples cover a wide range of
big data applications as listed in Table I. The class files of these
examples are readily available in the hadoop distributions.
First, control-flow graph factory [32] was used to generate
control flow graphs from the class files. These graphs are
stored in graphml format and given as input to a simple Sage-
Math [28] script that uses NetworkX library [31] and computes
the edge-disjoint MSAs and hashes them using MD5. A C++
application was used to implement encryption and secure
communication needed for the proposed IDS technique. The
implementation was based on framework from [5]. The hashes
are fixed length strings and so we restrained to using a basic
numeric key based left/right shift for encryption/decryption of
messages. Since there are no benchmarks for some of these ex-
amples, we executed them with minimum input requirements.
TABLE I: List of Hadoop Map Reduce Examples
E.No Name Description
1 wordmean A map/reduce program that counts the average
length of the words in the input files.
2 pentomino A map/reduce tile laying program to find
solutions to pentomino problems.
3 distbbp A map/reduce program that uses a BBP type
formula to compute the exact bits of pi.
4 aggregate-
wordcount
An Aggregate based map/reduce program that
counts the words in the input files.
5 sec-
ondarysort
An example defining a secondary sort to the
reduce.
6 aggregate-
wordhist
An Aggregate based map/reduce program that
computes the histogram of the words in the input
files.
7 ran-
domwriter
A map/reduce program that writes 10 GB of
random data per node.
8 teravali-
date
Check the results of the terasort.
9 qmc A map/reduce program that estimates the value of
Pi using a quasi-Monte Carlo (qMC) method.
10 wordstan-
darddevia-
tion
A map/reduce program that counts the standard
deviation of the length of the words in the input
files.
11 wordme-
dian
A map/reduce program that counts the median
length of the words in the input files.
12 bbp A map/reduce program that uses Bailey Borwein
Plouffe to compute the exact digits of pi.
13 teragen Generate data for the terasort.
14 sudoku A Sudoku solver.
15 wordcount A map/reduce program that counts the words in
the input files.
16 multi-
filewc
A job that counts words from several files.
C. Results
Table II, Figures 4a and 4b show the results of our ex-
periments. Figure 4a shows the comparison between the time
taken to run the hadoop map-reduce examples on a big data
cluster and the time taken to run the proposed intrusion
detection technique. The execution times for some examples
(represented by * in table II) are inconsistent among multiple
runs. We can notice from table II that only 0.81% of time taken
to execute an example is needed to analyze it for intrusion
detection. The time needed to run the proposed detection
technique includes (a) time taken to create CFG for the main
method from the class file; (b) time taken to extract MST set
from CFG; (c) time taken to hash the MSTs and encrypt them
and; (d) time taken to check for similarity among duplicate
processes by comparing the program signatures. All of these
values can be found in table II. The last row of this table gives
the average values. It can be noticed from Figure 4b that the
time required by the proposed technique is influenced by the
profiling method trying to extract MSAs from CFG, particu-
larly when there are more than one MSAs for a CFG. Though
the matching method performance is directly proportional to
the square of the size of the number of edge-disjoint MSAs
in a CFG i.e. O(n2) worst case complexity, we observed that
it is rare to have more than a couple of edge-disjoint MSAs
in a CFG because of the sparse nature of CFG.
TABLE II: Hadoop Map Reduce Examples - Program level time metrics in seconds
E.No Example Profilingmethod
CFG to
MSA
set
Hashing Matchingmethod
Avg
Hash
Match
Consensus Proposed ExecTime % Time
1 wordmean 0.0216 0.0216 7.89E-05 0.0190 0.0002 0.0187 0.0407 6.988 0.58%
2 pentomino 0.0288 0.0288 8.70E-05 0.0196 0.0013 0.0182 0.0485 4.914 0.99%
3 distbbp* 0.0567 0.0567 6.29E-05 0.0150 0.0019 0.0130 0.0718 28.58 0.25%
4 aggregatewordcount 0.0070 0.007 5.70E-05 0.0145 0.0002 0.0143 0.0215 19.002 0.11%
5 secondarysort* 0.0199 0.0199 5.10E-05 0.0072 0.0018 0.0054 0.0272 11.657 0.23%
6 aggregatewordhist 0.0066 0.0066 4.20E-05 0.0135 0.0012 0.0122 0.0201 18.024 0.11%
7 randomwriter 0.2561 0.2561 8.58E-05 0.0217 0.0025 0.0191 0.2779 29.111 0.95%
8 teravalidate 0.0181 0.0181 5.20E-05 0.0169 0.0001 0.0168 0.0351 5.958 0.59%
9 qmc* 0.0238 0.0238 7.39E-05 0.0202 0.0015 0.0186 0.0440 11.657 0.38%
10 wordstandarddeviation 0.0193 0.0193 7.89E-05 0.0098 0.0021 0.0076 0.0292 7.112 0.41%
11 wordmedian 0.0312 0.0312 6.20E-05 0.0208 0.0020 0.0187 0.0520 7.028 0.73%
12 bbp 0.0415 0.0415 9.08E-05 0.0118 0.0003 0.0115 0.0534 6.865 0.78%
13 teragen 0.0169 0.0169 5.51E-05 0.0131 0.0023 0.0108 0.0301 4.905 0.61%
14 sudoku* 0.0177 0.0177 5.60E-05 0.0156 0.0006 0.0150 0.0334 11.657 0.29%
15 wordcount 0.3672 0.3672 6.99E-05 0.0221 0.0023 0.0197 0.3893 7.034 5.54%
16 multifilewc 0.0159 0.0159 5.20E-05 0.0118 0.0001 0.0116 0.0277 5.963 0.47%
Average Values 0.0593 0.0592 6.59E-05 0.0158 0.0013 0.0144 0.07516 11.657 0.81%
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Fig. 4: A time comparison between (a) Proposed IDS tech-
nique and run-time for map-reduce examples. (b) Profiling and
matching methods of the proposed IDS technique.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we introduced a novel approach to detect pro-
gram level intrusions in big data systems with help of control
flow analysis. The main idea is to use the replication property
of big data systems and check for coherence in program
behavior among replica datanodes. Behavior of a program is
modeled by extracting a MSA set representation of its CFG.
Similarity check among duplicate programs is performed by a
complete matching among hashed sets of MSAs. Experiments
were conducted on real-world hadoop map-reduce examples
and it is observed that the proposed technique takes only 0.8%
of execution time to identify intrusions. The naturally sparse
nature of CFGs helps in achieving this low overhead. For
future work, we would like to explore graph string matching
and compare the proposed matching method (step2) with other
graph isomorphism techniques.
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